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Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors:  
Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members 
 
Abstract 
 
I use a sample of 409 companies that restate their earnings in 1997-2001 to examine 
penalties for outside directors, particularly audit committee members, when their 
companies experience accounting restatements. Penalties from lawsuits and Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) actions are limited. However, directors experience 
significant labor market penalties. In the three years after the restatement, director 
turnover is 48% for firms that restate earnings downward, 33% for a performance-
matched sample, 28% for firms that restate upwards, and only 18% for technical 
restatement firms. For firms that overstate earnings, the likelihood of director departure 
increases in restatement severity, particularly for audit committee directors. In addition, 
directors of these firms are no longer present in 25% of their positions on other boards. 
This loss is greater for audit committee members and for more severe restatements. A 
matched-sample analysis also confirms this result. Overall, the evidence is consistent 
with outside directors, especially audit committee members, bearing reputational costs for 
financial reporting failure.  
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Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors:  
Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent accounting scandals raise questions about the role of the board and the 
audit committee in monitoring financial reporting. Regulators have responded with 
governance reforms that attempt to enhance the role of outside directors in financial 
reporting oversight.1
Prior research suggests that directors are held accountable for corporate failures 
(e.g., bankruptcy) because board turnover increases following these events (e.g., Gilson 
[1990]). However, there is no evidence on whether there are penalties for outside 
directors for financial reporting failure. A priori, it is unclear whether directors should be 
 Although academic research has extensively studied the relationship 
between board independence and financial reporting, little is known about the 
consequences of financial reporting failure for outside directors. In this study I examine 
legal and reputational penalties for outside directors, particularly those on the audit 
committee, when their companies experience financial reporting failure.  
Fama and Jensen [1983] and Lorsch and MacIver [1989] argue that the primary 
benefits from board membership for outside directors are prestige, reputation, learning 
opportunities, and networking. In an efficient director labor market, directors who 
perform their board functions effectively are likely to be rewarded with additional board 
appointments and benefits; those who perform poorly will be penalized by loss in their 
positions and benefits. 
                                                 
1 Outside directors are those board members who have no relationship with the company other than their 
role as directors. They are also sometimes referred to as independent directors. Other directors are 
classified as Insiders and affiliated (or grey) directors. Insiders are executives of the company. Affiliated 
directors are those with potential conflicts of interests. The conflicts can include consulting arrangements, 
family relationship, and interlocking board memberships. 
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held accountable for these events. Boards are certainly responsible for overseeing the 
firm audit and adequacy of internal controls. Financial reporting problems are typically 
material events for the firm, as shown by the large negative stock market reactions to 
their announcement. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the likelihood of financial 
reporting problems can be diminished with greater independence and expertise on boards 
and audit committees (Beasley [1996], Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1996], Farber 
[2004], Agarwal and Chadha [2003]). However, because outside directors depend on 
managers and auditors for information they may be in no position to second-guess the 
external or internal auditor, or to detect management fraud.  Academic studies examining 
board accountability are generally hampered by the lack of performance measures for 
individual directors because boards function as a composite entity. In this study I attempt 
to deconstruct board performance by using accounting failures as a performance measure 
to evaluate audit committee directors who are directly responsible for monitoring 
financial reporting and to compare them with non-audit committee directors who may 
bear lesser responsibility for the failure.  
I use a sample of 409 companies that announced restatements in 1997 to 2001 to 
provide evidence on the labor market penalties for outside directors, particularly audit 
committee members, from financial reporting problems. Three different types of 
restatements are identified and examined separately: income-decreasing, income-
increasing, and technical restatements. The occurrence of a restatement implies not only 
that an irregularity occurred but also that it was detected. Because audit committees 
monitor the system within which the irregularities are both committed and detected, a 
restatement does not necessarily imply audit committee failure. Responsibility for 
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commission implies audit committee failure whereas detection implies audit committee 
effectiveness. I use the severity of the restatement to proxy for the extent of monitoring 
failure, as restatements of greater severity are more likely to represent audit committee 
failure than less severe restatements. 
The primary analysis examines director turnover and loss in other board positions 
for audit committee directors compared with other outside directors for the income-
decreasing restatements sample. Non-audit committee directors provide a powerful 
matched sample because they belong to the same company but are not directly 
responsible for financial reporting. The income-decreasing restatements sample consists 
of 264 companies (with 1,272 outside directors). I then examine the income-increasing 
and technical restatement samples. The income-increasing sample consists of 332 
directors in 69 companies, and the technical restatements sample consists of 412 directors 
in 76 companies. Finally, to provide a benchmark of non-restating firms I create a non 
restatement sample of companies matched by industry, year, and performance for all the 
264 income-decreasing restatement companies. I conduct a differences-in-differences 
estimation by comparing the turnover and loss in other directorships for the audit 
committee members relative to non audit committee directors in the income-decreasing 
restatement sample to the same difference in the non restating companies. I also repeat 
this analysis for a subset of 51 pairs where both the restatement and matched sample 
experienced CEO turnover, thereby matching on firm performance and CEO turnover. 
Penalties are strongest for outside directors of the income-decreasing restatements 
sample. These restatements are followed by abnormally high board turnover, with 48.1% 
of outside directors turning over within three years of the restatement announcement 
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compared to a turnover of only 14% in the three years prior to the restatement.2
Compared to the income-decreasing sample, companies making restatements that 
increase reported income exhibit a significantly lower turnover of 27.8% and a lower loss 
in other directorships. Within this sample, the likelihood of turnover is greater for the 
audit committee directors in firms with severe restatements, similar to income-decreasing 
restatements. However, estimates for some other variables are unstable between the 
models. Technical restatements (not misstatements and made for routine actions such as 
Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB] pronouncements) have a turnover of only 
18.6% and no significant change in other directorships. As expected, director turnover 
and loss in other directorships are not related to either the severity of the restatement or to 
audit committee membership. The matched-sample firms exhibit a lower director 
turnover rate (33%) than income-decreasing restatements sample and a lower loss in 
other directorships. Compared to the directors in the control sample, audit committee 
directors of the income-decreasing restatement companies are more likely to turnover and 
lose other board positions than non-audit committee directors. This result is further 
 The 
likelihood of director turnover increases with the severity of the restatement and is 
greater for audit committee members than for other directors. Following the restatement, 
directors of these companies also lose board positions in other companies. This loss is 
greater for audit committee directors, for more severe restatements, and for directors who 
leave the restating company. The analysis controls for the effect of firm performance 
since poor performance could also contribute to the observed turnover.  
                                                 
2 Yermack [2003] finds a 4.6% annual unconditional turnover rate for his sample of directors from Fortune 
500 companies between 1994 and 1996. 
 5 
confirmed for the sub sample where both the restating and matched firm experience CEO 
turnover. 
In contrast to the preceding evidence on career consequences, I find that outside 
directors face little discipline through regulatory actions or private litigation. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) does not cite outside directors when it 
pursues enforcement action against the restating company and its managers. Securities 
class action litigation against outside directors is also limited. Only 78 of the 2,016 
directors are named as defendants in lawsuits (of which 68 are from the 1,272 directors in 
the income-decreasing sample). Audit committee members are no more likely to be sued 
than other outside directors. Content analysis of the lawsuits shows that outside directors 
are likely to be sued only when they sell shares during the misstatement period. 
Moreover, in all cases where the lawsuit settlement information is available, the directors 
(and managers) do not pay any portion of the settlement, which is typically paid by the 
company and its insurance provider. These results show that outside directors do not face 
direct legal liability for poor monitoring of financial reporting. The market for directors 
appears to be the primary mechanism for holding directors responsible for financial 
reporting failure.  
Overall, the results suggest that restatements are associated with labor market 
penalties for outside directors, particularly audit committee members. Although prior 
literature tends to interpret this as a reputational consequence, it could also be the result 
of directors voluntarily opting out of boards. Although the analysis cannot rule out 
voluntary departure as an explanation for the results, the evidence nevertheless has 
implications for our understanding of the incentives of outside directors and audit 
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committee members. The evidence here is consistent with ex-post settling up in the 
market for directors. This may provide ex-ante incentives to motivate directors to be 
diligent in their oversight role. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant prior 
literature, outlines the hypotheses, and develops the research design. Section 3 describes 
the sample, data collection, and descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the results for 
own-board turnover and section 5 for loss in other board positions. Section 6 presents 
results with the control sample and robustness tests, section 7 discusses legal penalties 
and investor reaction, and section 8 concludes. 
2. Prior Literature, Hypotheses Development, and Research Design 
2.1 Restatements 
I use earnings restatements to identify financial reporting failure for the following 
reasons.3 Restatements are an acknowledgement that prior financial statements were not 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) (Palmrose and 
Scholz [2004]).4
                                                 
3 Other studies that have used restatements as a proxy for financial reporting quality include Kinney, 
Palmrose, and Scholz [2003], Myers et al. [2003], Richardson et al. [2003], and Palmrose and Scholz 
[2004]. 
4 Management has a legal duty to correct inaccurate filings. Skinner [1997, p. 252] quoting SEC guidelines, 
states, “there is a duty to correct statements made in any filing … if the statements either have become 
inaccurate by virtue of subsequent events, or are later discovered to have been false and misleading from 
the outset, and the issuer knows or should know that persons are continuing to rely on all or any material 
portion of the statements.” 
 They indicate a breakdown in a firm’s internal control system (Kinney 
and McDaniel [1989]). Restatements have a material adverse effect on firm valuation. 
Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz [2004] report a market reaction of -9.2% to 
restatement announcements over a two-day (0,1) window. Wu [2002] reports that 
earnings response coefficients decline following restatements, likely indicating a loss of 
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confidence in the company’s earnings quality. Hribar and Jenkins [2004] show that the 
firm’s cost of capital increases following a restatement announcement.  
Restatements can decrease reported income (income-decreasing) or increase 
reported income (income-increasing). Income-decreasing restatements suggest that prior 
accounting was aggressive, whereas income-increasing restatements, though still 
improper accounting, suggest either conservative accounting or “big-bath” behavior. 
Prior studies suggest that it is important to distinguish between these types of 
restatements (Callen, Linat, and Segal [2002], Myers et al., [2003]).  
Restatements can also be technical in nature and not misstatements 
(Raghunandan, Read, and Whinesant [2003], Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz [2004]). 
These arise from routine actions such as discontinued operations or FASB emerging 
issues task force rulings. Prior studies ignore these types of restatements. However, I 
examine them here as a form of benchmark sample. 
2.2 Boards and Financial Reporting 
My study focuses on outside directors, particularly those on the audit committee, 
because the academic literature and regulators emphasize the role of these directors in 
monitoring financial reporting. For example, in 1999, the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and NASDAQ modified their listing standards to require that firms maintain an 
audit committee with at least three outside directors. Recently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002) requires audit committees to be comprised entirely of independent directors, 
including at least one financial expert. 
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 Prior literature studies board and audit committee independence and its 
association with the quality of accounting.5 For example, Klein [2002] shows that 
independence in audit committees is negatively associated with the level of earnings 
management. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1996], Beasley [1996], and Farber [2004] 
report a greater percentage of insiders on boards using samples of SEC enforcement 
action companies. However, using a more recent sample of restatement firms, Agarwal 
and Chadha [2003] find no difference in the proportion of insiders compared to a 
matched sample. Some other results relating governance to accounting quality are mixed 
as well. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1996], Beneish [1999], and Agarwal and Chadha 
[2003] find no association between name-brand auditors and the likelihood of fraud.6
Prior studies find mixed evidence on top management turnover following 
detection of financial reporting fraud. Livingston [1997] finds that CEO turnover is more 
likely following SEC enforcement action than in other years. The departing CEOs are 
 
This contrasts with Farber [2004] who reports a smaller proportion of “name brand” audit 
firms in fraud firms compared to control firms but nevertheless finds that this difference 
persists for four years after fraud identification. With respect to audit committees, Farber 
finds that audit committees of fraud firms meet less frequently than control firms, a 
finding in contrast with Beasley [1996], who finds no such evidence in his sample. In 
contrast to this literature that examines the impact of boards on financial reporting 
outcomes, my study studies the impact of financial reporting failure on directors, 
particularly for those on the audit committee.  
                                                 
5 Larcker, Richardson and Tuna [2004] however, provide evidence of the modest ability of governance 
variables to explain managerial decisions and firm outcomes. 
6 I use the term “name brand” to refer to Big 6, Big 5 or Big 4 audit firms that these studies use as relevant 
to the time period of the particular study. 
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unable to obtain similar positions at other exchange listed firms. Desai et al. [2004] find 
greater top management turnover than a matched sample and that 92% of the managers 
do not find comparable employment after departure. However, Beneish [1999] reports 
that CEO turnover after to discovery of income overstatement is no different from that of 
a control sample that do not overstate earnings. These studies focus on managers and do 
not examine consequences for boards and audit committees. Agarwal, Jaffe, and Karpoff 
[1999] find no association between occurrence of corporate fraud (in a sample that 
includes financial reporting fraud) and subsequent managerial or board turnover. Farber 
[2004] examines a sample of 87 firms subject to SEC enforcement action and presents 
univariate results showing that, compared to a matched sample, the fraud firms replace 
insiders with outside directors, but Farber does not comment on the composition of 
outsiders. The univariate comparisons also find an increase in the number of outsiders on 
the board and audit committee (statistical significance is not reported), but these are no 
different from the changes to the control sample.7
2.3 Market for Outside Directors 
 My study adds to this stream of 
literature by examining only outside directors, focusing on audit committee members. In 
addition, I study previously unexplored labor market reputational consequences as 
measured by the impact on other directorships for these directors. 
 
My primary analysis examines labor market penalties—loss in position on the 
restating company’s board and loss in positions on other boards following a restatement. 
Board membership confers benefits to directors. Fama and Jensen [1983] suggest that 
                                                 
7 Farber [2004] does not use performance as a matching attribute in creating the control sample nor is it 
controlled for in the analysis, thereby limiting the conclusions that can be drawn from the study because 
fraud firms are also likely to be poor performers. Prior literature suggests that board composition is affected 
by poor performance (Hermalin and Weisbach [1988]). 
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outside directors are rewarded by the reputation they develop as expert monitors of 
managers. They argue that outside directors “use their directorships to signal to internal 
and external markets for decision agents that (1) they are decision experts…” (p. 315).  
Directors also gain from prestige, networking, and from learning opportunities when they 
serve on other boards. Such nonpecuniary rewards are typically considered more 
important than direct financial incentives (Mace [1986], Lorsch and MacIver [1989], 
Harford [2003]).8
Empirically, prior evidence is consistent with ex post settling up. Gilson [1990] 
finds that only 46% of incumbent directors remain after bankruptcy reorganization and 
that departing directors hold 33% fewer other directorships after three years. Coles and 
Hoi [2003] provide evidence that directors of companies not adopting takeover protection 
  
An efficient director labor market will likely reward directors who have a 
reputation for effectiveness with additional board positions and associated benefits, and 
penalize the poor performers by loss of their positions and benefits. Fama and Jensen 
[1983] posit the existence of such a market and argue that directors face reputational 
penalties from ex post settling up in the labor market when monitoring is seen to fail. 
Directors may therefore have an ex-ante incentive to be efficient monitors. On the other 
hand, the costs of monitoring (e.g., talent, developing the required expertise, time) may 
result in director shirking. 
                                                 
8 Table 2.4 in Lorsch and MacIver [1989] lists the following personal benefits from board membership 
based on survey responses. In order of importance they are: opportunity to learn, seeing new businesses, 
establishing contacts to enhance business relationships, opportunity to contribute to society, and 
compensation. 
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measures are three times more likely to gain additional directorships than directors of 
companies that protect themselves against takeovers.9
A priori, it is unclear whether director turnover will occur after a restatement. 
Audit committee directors could lose their positions for a few reasons. First, the audit 
committee, and to a lesser extent the entire board, is responsible for the oversight of audit 
and internal controls. Agarwal and Chadha [2004] find a smaller proportion of 
independent directors with an accounting background in restatement firms compared to a 
matched sample. Farber [2004] finds that fraud firms audit committees hold fewer 
meetings and fewer financial experts on them. This suggests a positive association 
between expertise on the audit committee and detection of accounting irregularities.
  
10 
The restatement can therefore indicate an oversight failure, creating a need for new audit 
committee directors to improve oversight. Second, restatements decrease firm value and 
lower the reputational capital of the firm. New directors may signal new leadership and 
bring with them fresh reputational capital.11
                                                 
9 See also Kaplan and Reihsus [1990], Agarwal, Jaffe, and Karpoff [1999], Brickley, Coles, and Linck 
[1999], Farrell and Whidbee [2000], Ferris, Jagnnathan, and Pritchard [2003], Harford [2003], and 
Yermack [2003] for further evidence. There is also a large literature in organization behavior, strategy, and 
sociology on this aspect. I do not review this literature because of space limitations. 
10 As a caveat to this interpretation, Agarwal and Chadha [2003] and Farber [2004] find no difference in the 
number of outsiders on the audit committee between their treatment and control samples. Also, Farber finds 
that the difference in financial expertise on the audit committee between the sample and control firms 
persists for four years after fraud identification, raising the question of why fraud firms find no need to 
improve the audit committee on this dimension.  
11 For example, new directors at WorldCom include Nicholas B Katzenbach, former U.S. Attorney General 
and Dennis Beresford, former chairman of the FASB. Furthermore, Agarwal and Knoeber [2001] suggest 
that directors provide lobbying services for their firms to gain regulatory favors. This can be valuable when 
firms are under increased scrutiny. 
 Third, restatements are often followed by 
CEO turnover, which has been shown to be associated with board turnover (Farrell and 
Whidbee  [2000]). Finally, directors may leave voluntarily to avoid the responsibility and 
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work involved with restructuring a troubled company (Vafeas [1999]) or to contain 
damage to their reputations.12
However, there are also reasons why we may not observe evidence of audit 
committee accountability. First, director responsibility is indirect since they only provide 
oversight and depend on managers and auditors for information. Consistent with this, 
Beasley [1996] finds that the presence of an audit committee does not affect the 
likelihood of fraud. Based on survey evidence of 250 non-executive directors, 
Hooghiemstra and Van Manen [2004] report that the directors express strong doubts 
about their ability to obtain timely and adequate information.
  
13
                                                 
12 Companies rarely announce the reasons for director departure, making it difficult to discriminate between 
forced and voluntary departure. 
13 This is consistent with a recent Mckinsey survey that reports that most directors surveyed said that they 
depend on management to set the agenda of board meetings and few respondents felt that they really knew 
what was going on in their companies (Felton, Berrymand, and Stephenson [2004]). 
 Agarwal and Chadha 
[2003] find that the CFO serves on the audit committee in a statistically significant 
proportion of their control firms than in restating firms, suggesting a greater information 
flow to the audit committee in the former companies. Also consistent with this reasoning, 
courts and private litigants are rarely seen as holding outside directors accountable, 
allowing them latitude under the business judgment rule while holding managers 
responsible for the alleged infractions (Black, Cheffins, and Klausner [2003]).  Second, 
because restatements require GAAP violations to be detected, it is not clear whether they 
represent success or failure by the audit committee. The cost associated with establishing 
pre emptive internal controls to eliminate all violations is likely prohibitive (Jensen 
[1993]). Good monitoring may identify the problem quickly and ensured timely 
disclosure. There is no reason to expect that effective directors will be replaced. Finally, 
entrenched boards are an important feature in companies (Bebchuk, Coates, and 
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Subramanian [2002], Bebchuk and Cohen  [2004]). For example, CEO–chair duality on 
boards is often used as a proxy for poor governance by extant literature. Prior literature 
observes prevalence of network ties and group norms in corporate boards (Davis and 
Greve [1997], Khurana [2002], Davis, Yoo, and Baker [2003]). Unlike managers, 
directors do not report to a higher authority that can easily replace them for poor 
performance (Yermack [2003]). Although in theory shareholders elect directors, in 
practice it is difficult to recall them.14
If boards are accountable for reporting failure, the likelihood of director departure 
should depend primarily on the severity of the problem and the responsibility that 
specific directors bear for the failure. Restatement severity therefore serves as a proxy for 
the extent of monitoring failure. I assume that accountability for a reporting failure is 
higher for audit committee members than for other directors, as the board delegates to the 
 Therefore, it is remains an empirical issue as to 
whether directors would be held accountable for financial reporting failure. 
Audit committee directors could also lose positions on other boards due to loss in 
reputation as an effective monitor. In addition to the preceding arguments, loss in other 
board positions also requires that the market for directors attribute the failure to poor 
oversight, use the information to infer directors’ abilities, and act to penalize the director. 
However, the penalty may not manifest itself if the director has a track record of 
performance from other positions (e.g., CEO or director of another company). 
Alternatively, CEO’s may prefer lax monitoring and find poor monitors attractive as 
candidates for their boards (Shivdasani and Yermack [1999]). 
2.4 Hypotheses and Tests for Director Departure from the Restating Company Board. 
                                                 
14 Bebchuk [2002] provides a detailed overview of the process that illustrates the practical difficulty in 
dissident shareholders nominating new board members. 
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audit committee the responsibility to monitor financial reporting. This results in the 
following two hypotheses (both stated in the alternative form): 
H1:   Turnover for outside directors is increasing in the severity of the restatement.  
H2: Audit committee directors of restating firms experience a greater likelihood of 
turnover than other outside directors. 
 
Following Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz [2004], I measure severity of the 
restatement by its duration (number of quarters restated) and magnitude measured as the 
dollar value of cumulative change in net income (absolute values of restated less 
originally reported income) scaled by total assets at year-end immediately preceding to 
the restatement announcement. Duration measures the length of time the quality of 
accounting was compromised, while higher restatement magnitude indicates poorer prior 
representation of the actual numbers. I also classify restatements as interim or annual 
depending on whether the company restates quarterly financials (which are reviewed 
rather than audited) or the annual audited statements (Myers et al. [2003], Palmrose and 
Scholz [2004]). It may be that restating annual financials that have been subject to 
external audit are more indicative of poor control systems that restating interim un 
audited numbers.  
To test the hypotheses, I model the probability of director departure as a function 
of restatement severity, audit committee status, and firm- and director-specific control 
variables using the following logit model. Table 1 provides definitions of the variables. 
 Pr (DEPARTURE=1) = F (α0 + α1AUDIT COMM + α2SEVERITY + α3AUDIT COMM X SEVERITY + 
α4PERFORMANCE + α5SIZE + α6CEO TURNOVER + α7BOARD SIZE + 
α8BOARD SHARE + α9OUTSIDERS + α10CEO FOUNDER + α11AGE + 
α12TENURE + α13DIRECTOR SHARE + α14OTHER CEO + α15OTHER 
DIRECTORSHIPS + α16FIN EXPERT + α17DIR_AFTER_CEO + α18DIR 
SELLER + εi)  (1) 
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The dependent variable, DEPARTURE, equals 1 if the director leaves the board 
within three years of the restatement year.15
Prior literature has found the following variable to be associated with director 
turnover: PERFORMANCE (Hermalin and Weisbach [1988], Gilson [1990], Yermack 
[2003]), SIZE (Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard [2003]), and CEO TURNOVER 
(Farrell and Whidbee [2000]). I measure PERFORMANCE by the firm’s stock returns 
because I expect it to best capture the effect of the restatement and revised expectation of 
future performance. Following Yermack [2003], PERFORMANCE is measured as the 
firm’s stock return less the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted 
return, with both returns measured over the same time window as the dependent variable 
and compounded continuously before differencing. It is worth noting that because audit 
and non audit committee directors belong to the same firm, the effect of firm 
performance will apply equally to both (the estimates for the audit committee dummy are 
relative to nonaudit committee directors). SIZE is measured by total assets. CEO 
 The main independent variables of interest 
are AUDIT COMM (an indicator variable that equals 1 if the director is on the audit 
committee, and 0 otherwise), SEVERITY (duration or scaled magnitude of the 
restatement), and AUDIT COMM X SEVERITY (the interaction of these two variables). 
Because restatements require the misstatement to be detected, it is possible that it 
indicates success rather than failure on the part of the audit committee. I include the 
interaction term to examine the possibility that restatements of lesser severity are either 
not informative about monitoring effectiveness or indicate effectiveness rather than 
failure. 
                                                 
15 Many companies have staggered boards with each director serving a three-year term. In three years, 
therefore, every director would have had to come up for reelection. Because of this, most board turnover 
literature uses a three-year window to measure director turnover. 
 16 
TURNOVER equals 1 if CEO changes, and 0 otherwise. I include the variables board 
size, insider holding, and percentage of outsiders on the board to examine whether these 
governance characteristics are associated with turnover. 
Director-level controls AGE, TENURE, DIRECTOR SHARE, and OTHER 
DIRECTORSHIPS are included to be consistent with prior literature referenced earlier. I 
include the variable FIN EXPERT to examine whether financial experts are more likely 
to be held accountable for the failure. DIR SELLER equals 1 if the director was a net 
seller in the company’s stock during the misstatement period, and 0 otherwise. 
2.5 Hypotheses and Tests for Directorships in Other Companies 
If the restatement affects a director’s reputation as an effective monitor, it could 
lead to a loss of positions on other boards. To examine this hypothesis, I estimate changes 
in the number of other board positions held by the directors. As before, the perception of 
poor oversight is likely to be increasing in the severity of the failure. Furthermore, as 
discussed earlier, the impact should be greater for audit committee members.  
This results in the following two hypotheses (both stated in alternative form): 
H3:   Loss in other directorships is increasing in the severity of the restatement. 
H4:   Loss in other directorships for audit committee directors is greater than this  
loss for non-audit committee directors. 
I model the loss in positions on other boards as a function of audit committee 
membership, restatement severity, and other firm and director level control variables. 
OTHER DIRECTOR LOSS =    β0 + β1AUDIT COMM + β2SEVERITY + β3AUDIT COMM X 
SEVERITY + β4PERFORMANCE + β5SIZE + β6AGE + 
β7TENURE + β8OTHER CEO + β9OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS 
+ β10FIN EXPERT + β11DIRECTOR  DEPARTURE + β12DIR 
SELLER + ηI       (2) 
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Table 1 provides definitions of all the variables. The dependent variable OTHER 
DIRECTOR LOSS measures the number of board positions lost by directors of restating 
companies in three years following the restatement. As in equation (1), the main 
independent variables are AUDIT COMM, SEVERITY, and AUDIT COMM X 
SEVERITY. 
Firm level control variables are PERFORMANCE and SIZE. I include 
PERFORMANCE to control for the documented effect of firm performance on other 
directorships (Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard [2003], Yermack [2003]). As mentioned 
previously, note that the effect of firm performance applies equally to audit and non-audit 
committee directors of the company. Director level controls are AGE, TENURE, OTHER 
CEO (which equals 1 if the director is the CEO of a public company), and OTHER 
DIRECTORSHIPS. I expect OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS to have a positive coefficient 
because directors with more positions are likely to lose more than those with fewer 
positions. Furthermore, directors that begin with zero positions cannot lose any seats.16
The sample consists of firms that announced restatements from 1997 to 2001 as 
provided in Government Accounting Office (GAO) [2002].
 
FIN EXPERT is included to examine whether the reputational penalty varies for financial 
experts. DIRECTOR DEPARTURE allows me to distinguish between directors who left 
the restating company board and those who continued.  
3. Sample  
3.1 Restating Company Sample 
17
                                                 
16 I do not exclude these directors from the analysis since they can gain new directorships. 
17 This dataset was created by the U.S. General Accounting Office as required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Please refer GAO [2002] for details of the methodology used to create the database. 
 Table 2 explains the sample 
construction. The GAO database lists 794 companies, of which 11 companies did not 
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eventually restate, 74 are multiple restatements by the same company (I include them 
only once), and 32 are foreign companies. I also drop companies for which I cannot 
collect the required data for the three years following the restatement announcement: 81 
companies without CRSP or Compustat data and 187 companies stopped filing proxy 
statements or 10-Ks (needed to collect director data) because they delisted or merged. 
 My primary sample consists of the 264 companies that make income-decreasing 
restatements. However, I also examine separately the 69 income-increasing restatements 
and 76 technical restatements. Income-decreasing restatements suggest that the firm has 
followed aggressive accounting practices. Consequently, I expect my primary sample to 
provide the most powerful test of the hypotheses.  
The relationship for the income-increasing sample is unclear. Although these are 
accounting failures, they may not be perceived to be as much of a failure as the income-
decreasing cases because they do not suggest aggressive accounting. The market reaction 
to restatements announcements confirms this conjecture. Mean (median) cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) over a two-day (0,1) window around restatement 
announcements are  -4.7% (-4.6%) for income increasing cases versus -13.1% (-7.4%) for 
income-decreasing restatements. Both are significant at the 1% level. 
Technical restatements are not improper accounting. For this reason, prior 
research has typically ignored these companies (e.g., Raghunandan, Read, and Whinesant 
[2003], Palmrose and Scholz [2004]). Hence, this sample should not exhibit the 
hypothesized relationships. Consistent with this expectation, the mean (median) CAR for 
technical restatements at -0.4% (-0.2%) is not different from zero.  
 19 
Table 3, Panel A provides the distribution of sample companies by the year of 
announcement, and Panel B provides the industry distribution. 
3.2 Outside Directors 
 For each director of the 409 restating companies, I collect data on age, profession, 
tenure, audit committee membership, other directorships, stock owned in restating 
company, and conflicts of interest from the proxy statement.  
As discussed before, I examine only outside directors.18
 DIRECTOR DEPARTURE is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the director 
leaves the board within three years of the restatement announcement year, and 0 
otherwise. OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS measures the number of board seats held by 
sample directors in other public companies (not including the restating company).
 Outside directors are 
defined as those board members who have no relationship with the company other than 
their role as directors. For the primary sample of 264 income-decreasing companies this 
classification results in 1,272 (63% of the board) outsiders from a total of 2,020 directors. 
The income-increasing and technical samples have 332 (65.5%) and 412 (67.0%) outside 
directors, respectively. 
19
I collect data on other directorships in the post-restatement period as follows. For 
those who continue on the board, data is from the restating firm’s proxy statement. For 
 I 
only include positions where the director is exclusively an outside monitor (such as in the 
restating company) and not a manager (e.g., CEO).  
                                                 
18 Recall from footnote 1 that other directors are classified as insiders and affiliated (or grey) directors. 
Insiders are executives of the company. Affiliated directors are those with conflicts of interests. The 
conflicts include consulting arrangements, family relationship, and interlocking board memberships.  
19 I use Compact Disclosure and SEC Edgar to check if a company is listed. Many directors serve on boards 
of private companies and non profits. I ignore these because this information is not uniformly disclosed 
(not a required disclosure) and because their importance is difficult to interpret. This convention is 
followed by most prior studies (e.g., Kaplan and Reihsus [1990] and Coles and Hoi, [2003]. 
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those that leave, data is no longer available in the proxy. In such cases, I collect 
information from the proxy of any other company where the director had served; the 
Standard&Poor’s Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives; the Compact 
Disclosure database, and 10K Wizard. This lets me track directors even if they leave the 
sample company and then gain a board seat at another firm. The variable OTHER 
DIRECTOR LOSS is the net loss in other directorships in three years following the event 
year. If a director gives up one position for another, the net change is zero. 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4, panel A provides descriptive data on the sample companies. On average, 
these restatements are an economically significant event both in terms of their severity 
and in terms of the market’s reaction to them. For the income-decreasing sample, the 
mean (median) cumulative magnitude of net income restated is $41.5 million ($5.0 
million) and the mean (median) restatement magnitude scaled by total assets (at the year-
end prior to restatement announcement) is 8.3% (1.9%). Mean (median) length of the 
restatement is 6.1 (4) quarters. As noted earlier, the mean (median) market reaction to the 
restatement announcement, measured by the CAR over a two-day window (0,1), is -
13.14% (-7.4%). 
Restatements are followed by considerable legal challenges and governance 
changes. The SEC took enforcement action resulting in an Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release (AAER) against 61 companies.20
                                                 
20 This number may be understated since the SEC typically takes a few years to complete investigations and 
release the AAER. 
 Securities class action lawsuits 
were filed against 135 companies. CEO turnover occurred in 147 companies and CFO 
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changed in 191 firms, in many cases within a few days of the announcement. Auditors 
changed in 117 companies.  
Table 4, panel A also provides descriptive statistics for income-increasing and 
technical restatements. Some important differences with the income-decreasing sample 
are seen. At the mean (median) level, income-increasing companies are significantly (at 
the 1% level) larger, better performers, and experience a smaller negative announcement 
return than income-decreasing companies. They also experience fewer lawsuits, SEC 
enforcement action, CEO turnover, and auditor change. This suggests that these 
restatements are not as serious an accounting failure as income-decreasing restatements.  
Companies making technical restatements have significantly (at the 1% level) 
better performance and lower announcement returns than income-decreasing companies. 
The mean (median) announcement return of -0.4% (-0.2%) is not different from zero at 
conventional significance levels. They do not experience any litigation or SEC action, 
and they have a lower rate of CEO and auditor turnover than both the earlier samples. 
This suggests that this sample is unlikely to suffer the penalties that are the focus of this 
study. 
Table 4, panel B provides descriptive data on sample outside directors. For the 
income-decreasing sample, 712 of the 1,272 outside directors are audit committee 
members. The mean age and board tenure is 57.5 and 6.3 years, respectively. Outside 
directors do not hold large equity stakes, with a mean (median) of 1.24% (0.07%) of the 
company’s equity. The median director of the income decreasing sample owns $255,000 
worth of shares in the company. This suggests a announcement window (0,1) loss of  
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approximately $33,500 and a loss of $65,000 if held through the restatement 
announcement year.  
4. Restatements and Own-Board Turnover 
4.1 Univariate Analysis 
 
 Figure 1 plots the turnover of outside directors for three years before and after the 
restatement announcement year for all three samples. Restatements are followed by 
considerable turnover for the income-decreasing sample, with about 48.1% of the outside 
directors leaving within three years. Most of the turnover occurs in years 1 and 2. 
Income-increasing restatements are followed by a turnover of 27.8% in a similar time 
frame, although the turnover is concentrated primarily in year 1. As the plot suggests, at 
18.6%, technical restatements do not experience a similar increase in turnover following 
the restatement as the other two samples. Turnover in the three years prior period 
averages 13.5%, 15.7%, and 13.9% for the income-decreasing, income-increasing, and 
technical samples, respectively. Figure 2 plots the turnover of outside directors for the 
income-decreasing sample and breaks out the sample by annual (more severe) and 
interim (less severe) restatements. 21
                                                 
21 Recall that consistent with prior literature (e.g., Myers et al. [2003]), I define as interim those 
restatements that corrected unaudited financials. Annual restatements are those that corrected audited 
financials.  
 As expected, the plot shows that turnover is greater 
for annual restatements than for interim ones. In unreported statistics, I also find that in 
the 144 companies in the income-decreasing sample that have staggered boards, 20.1% of 
the outside directors leave before the end of their terms. Table 5 presents Pearson 
correlations for the variables for the income-decreasing restatements sample. 
4.2 Director Level Tests for Income-Decreasing Restatements Sample 
 23 
As discussed earlier, the primary tests examine the sample of income-decreasing 
restatements. Table 6 presents estimates from a logit regression of Equation (1) for this 
sample.22 Model 1 presents results with the severity of restatement measured by 
DURATION (number of quarters restated). Model 2 measures severity by MAGNITUDE 
(scaled restatement value). Results show that the likelihood of director turnover increases 
in the severity of the restatement under both definitions of severity. The coefficient on the 
interaction term shows that the likelihood of audit committee members leaving is 
increasing in the severity of the restatement. In regressions (not reported) without the 
interaction term, the audit committee variable is positive though not significant at 
conventional levels, implying that on average audit committee members are no more 
likely to leave than other outside directors. This suggests that audit committee members 
leave only when the restatement is severe, presumably reflecting limitations in their 
monitoring ability.23
Among the firm level control variables, performance, CEO turnover, and board 
shareholding are significantly correlated with director departure. Better performance is 
associated with a lower probability of director departure. This is consistent with Ferris, 
Jagannathan, and Pritchard [2003] and Yermack [2003]. Director departure is more likely 
when accompanied by CEO change, consistent with Farrell and Whidbee [2000], and 
 
                                                 
22 Because I use firm-level control variables in a director-level regression, the standard errors are likely to 
be understated because the number of independent observations is not equal to the number of directors. I 
correct for this with robust standard errors that take into account clustering by company. In discussing the 
results, I consider a 10% (two-tailed) or better significance as a statistically significant relationship. 
23 In unreported results, an indicator variable for annual restatements used as the severity measure is 
significant both by itself and in the interaction with audit committee variable. Recall that annual 
restatements correct misstatements of audited financials. This can be interpreted as annual restatements 
being more reflective of poor monitoring in a company.  
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Hermalin and Weisbach [1988], and is more likely with a higher level of shareholding by 
the board as a whole. 
Among director level controls, age, tenure, other directorships are associated in a 
statistically significant manner. Turnover is more likely for older directors and less likely 
for those with greater tenure (potentially more entrenched) and for those with more other 
directorships. Directors who are net sellers in the company stock during the misstatement 
period (perhaps suggesting that they were aware of the misreporting) are more likely to 
turnover.  All significant results are consistent across both models. 
To estimate the economic magnitude, I estimate marginal effects for the 
explanatory variables (calculated at the mean values of the other variables). The estimates 
(not reported) show that a one standard deviation change in DURATION (5.0 quarters) 
will lead to a 5.0% increase in the likelihood of departure for non-audit committee 
directors and an additional 5.0% increase for audit committee directors. A 1 standard 
deviation change in MAGNITUDE produces a 6.0% increase in the probability of 
director departure and audit committee members are 8.8% more likely to lose their 
positions than non-audit committee directors. The strongest effect, however, seems to be 
CEO change, which increases the likelihood of director change by 20% and 22% when 
severity is measured by DURATION and MAGNITUDE respectively. Comparison of the 
Pseudo R2 with and without the audit committee and severity variables shows that these 
variables contribute 26% (5% of the variation in the dependent variable in absolute 
terms) of the incremental explanatory power in model 1. By comparison, the firm level 
variables provide 51% of the incremental explanatory power. A likelihood ratio test on 
the null hypothesis that the audit committee, severity, and interaction terms are jointly 
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equal to zero in model 1 produces a chi-square statistic of 18.02 rejecting the null at 
<.001 level of significance. The table also provides classification accuracy of the models. 
At 71%, model 1 improves overall classification accuracy by about 37% (19% in absolute 
terms) compared to a naïve model which will be right 52% of the time. 
Nineteen percent of directors serve on the board for periods lesser than the 
duration of the restatement. Many directors join the board towards the end or after the 
misstatement period and could therefore be part of the solution rather than the problem. 
Model 3 uses REST QTRS SERVED to measure the number of quarters the director 
served on the board of the total misstatement period. Estimates are similar to those in 
model 1. Results show higher departure likelihood among directors who served for a 
longer period and audit committee members are more likely than other directors to turn 
over the greater the period they have served. Model 4 repeats model 1 without CEO 
turnover to understand the extent to which CEO turnover dilutes the results on the 
restatement and audit committee variables. DURATION, AUDIT COMM X 
DURATION, and PERFORMANCE improve their magnitudes and significance.24
 The analysis above in section 4.2 was at the director level.  I test for robustness of 
these results using the company as the unit of observation. Table 7, panel A provides 
estimates from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of audit committee turnover 
(in percentages) at the company level on restatement severity and control variables. 
Models 1 and 2 present results with DURATION and MAGNITUDE as SEVERITY 
measures, respectively. The dependent variable is the percentage turnover in the three-
   
4.3 Firm-Level Analysis for Income-Decreasing Restatements 
                                                 
24 I also repeat model 1 using CFO turnover instead of CEO turnover. The results are unchanged for the key 
variables. I find that the AGE variable loses its significance. 
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year post-restatement period. Consistent with the results in table 6, audit committee 
turnover is increasing in restatement severity and CEO turnover, and decreasing in firm 
performance in both the models.  
In panel B, I use a differences approach to examine audit committee turnover 
relative to the non-audit committee turnover. This controls for factors that may impact the 
board as a whole. The dependent variable is audit committee turnover less non-audit 
committee turnover in the post-restatement period. The results in both models support the 
earlier results from table 6 that audit committee turnover increases in restatement severity 
relative to non-audit committee turnover.  
4.4 Income-Increasing and Technical Restatements  
Table 8 presents the estimates from a logit regression of equation (1) for income-
increasing and technical restatements. Models 1 and 3 use DURATION while models 2 
and 4 use MAGNITUDE to measure severity.  
The results for the income-increasing sample are mixed. Estimates from model 1 
suggest that the likelihood of departure is increasing in the severity of the restatement for 
audit committee members similar to that observed for income-decreasing restatements. 
However, duration variable is not significant by itself. Model 2 estimates for audit 
committee member, magnitude, and their interaction are similar to those for income-
decreasing restatements but at lower levels of significance. Likelihood of director 
departure is decreasing in firm performance (only model 2), director shareholding, and 
for directors who are CEOs. Overall, the results weakly suggest that similar to income-
decreasing restatements, the likelihood of audit committee director turnover is increasing 
in restatement severity relative to non-audit committee directors.  
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In table 8, models 3 and 4, present results for the technical restatements sample. 
Consistent with expectations, the results show that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between director turnover and audit committee membership, restatement 
severity, or the interaction term. The only consistent statistically significant relationship 
observed is with firm performance.   
5. Loss in Other Board Positions 
5.1 Univariate Analysis 
Figure 3 plots the number of board positions that the directors hold in other 
companies for the three samples. The number of outside board positions is fairly stable in 
the years preceding the restatement announcement. The plot shows that other 
directorships for the income-decreasing sample decline significantly (p < .01) from 1.28 
to 0.97 on average, whereas the decline for the income-increasing restatements sample is 
much lower (and not statistically significant) from 1.35 to 1.29. Other directorships for 
the technical restatements sample do not change in a significant manner. 
Figure 4 plots the number of board positions for directors of the income-
decreasing sample and presents the plots separately for annual and interim restatements. 
The decline in other directorships is greater for directors in the annual restatement sample 
than for those in the interim restatements sample. These plots provide some initial 
evidence that restatements are associated with loss in other directorships for income-
decreasing restatements. I explore this further in the next section. 
5.2 Multivariate Analysis for Income Decreasing Restatement Sample 
Table 9 presents the results of an OLS regression of equation (2). Models 1, 2, 
and 3 present results with DURATION, MAGNITUDE, and REST QTRS SERVED as 
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the measures of severity, respectively. Model 1 results show that the coefficient of 
DURATION is positive and significant, suggesting that the loss in other directorships is 
increasing in the severity of the restatement. The coefficient on the interaction term is 
positive and significant. This shows that the loss in other directorships is increasing in the 
intensity of the restatement for audit committee members relative to those not on the 
audit committee. Increasing severity, therefore, has a relatively greater impact on audit 
committee directors presumably because they are responsible for financial reporting 
oversight. In regressions without the interaction term (not reported), I find a significant 
positive coefficient on the audit committee variable, implying that audit committee 
directors, on average, lose more other directorships than do non-audit committee 
directors. Model 2 and 3 results are similar for all the variables. In terms of economic 
significance, the coefficient estimates indicate that a change in restatement duration from 
the bottom to the top quartile (a six-quarter increase) results in an average of 0.18 (i.e., 6 
X 0.03) board positions lost for non-audit committee directors and an average of 0.36 
(i.e., 6 X {0.03 + 0.03}) board positions lost for audit committee directors. Therefore, for 
this increase in restatement severity, audit committee directors in the sample lose twice as 
many other board positions as do non-audit committee directors. 
Estimated coefficients for other variables indicate that the loss in other 
directorships is weakly greater for older directors and less if the director is the CEO of a 
public company. Financial experts lose more positions than those who are not. 
Presumably, the reputational impact is greater when those considered experts in financial 
reporting are associated with financial reporting failure. Directors who leave the restating 
company lose more other board seats than those who remain. Finally, directors who have 
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sold stock in the restating company during the misstatement period, perhaps identifying 
cases where they were aware of the misstatement, lose more other directorships. 
5.3 Firm Level Analysis for Income-Decreasing Restatements 
 As in section 4.3, I test for robustness of these results using the company as the 
unit of observation. Table 10 provides estimates from an OLS regression of the loss in 
directorships at the company level on restatement severity and control variables. The 
dependent variable is the loss in directorships in the post-restatement period aggregated 
for the audit committee directors of the company. Models 1 and 2 presents results with 
DURATION and Model 2 with MAGNITUDE. Panel A results show that loss in other 
directorships for audit committee directors is increasing in the severity of the restatement. 
In panel B, the dependent variable is the total loss in other directorships for audit 
committee directors less the total loss for non-audit committee directors. The results 
support the earlier results in table 9 that loss in other directorships for audit committee 
directors increases in the severity of the restatement relative to non-audit committee 
directors. The results are consistent across both the models. 
5.4 Income-Increasing and Technical Restatements  
Table 11 presents results from an OLS regression of equation (2) for income-
increasing and technical restatements. Models 1 and 2 present results for the income-
increasing sample. Estimates from both models show no statistically significant 
relationship between loss in other directorships and audit committee membership, 
severity of the restatement, or with their interaction. This suggests that the reputational 
effects are not evident for income-increasing restatements. However, in regressions (not 
reported) without the interaction term, I find that audit committee members are more 
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likely to lose their positions in both models (p value <.05, two-tailed). The high 
correlation (0.78) between the variables AUDIT COMM and the interaction term, 
combined with a relatively smaller sample size makes it difficult to conclusively interpret 
the insignificant estimates. 
 Models 3 and 4 present results for technical restatements. The results suggest that 
there is no significant relationship between loss in other directorships and either audit 
committee membership or severity of the restatement. This is consistent with 
expectations because technical restatements do not indicate financial reporting failure. 
Among the control variables, OTHER CEO (only model 3), and OTHER 
DIRECTORSHIPS exhibit a significant relationship to loss in other board positions. 
6. Matched Sample Analysis and Robustness Checks 
6.1 Constructing the Matched Sample 
 The earlier samples consisted of only restatement companies and I use the 
severity of restatement and the number of quarters the directors served during the 
misstatement as a proxy for the extent of oversight failure. In order to provide a 
benchmark using non restating firms, I select a control sample for each company in the 
primary sample of income-decreasing restatements. Restatements may be a symptom of 
poor performance and board turnover is known to be associated with poor performance 
(Hermalin and Weisbach  [1998]). Therefore, I identify a control firm with performance 
in the range of +/- 25% of the sample firm within the same four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code (failing which I use three- and two-digit levels). Within this 
band I select the firm that is closest in size to the sample firm. I am able to find matches 
for 242 of the sample companies. For the remaining 22 companies I select the control 
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firm closest in performance within the two-digit SIC code.25
 Because there is a difference in CEO turnover rate between the two samples, I 
also analyze a subsample of 51 companies where both the restating and the matched 
control firm experienced CEO turnover. Table 12, panel B presents univariate analysis 
 I collect data on outside 
directors and other variables similar to that described earlier. 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests 
 Table 12, panel A presents descriptive statistics for the income-decreasing and 
control sample companies. The two groups of firms are similar in performance and firm 
size indicating that the matching process has been successful. In results (not reported) I 
also find that they are similar on other dimensions (e.g., board size, percentage of 
outsiders on the board, frequency of staggered boards, CEO founder, director age, and 
tenure). CEO turnover is significantly greater for the income-decreasing restatements, 
suggesting that at a given level of performance, boards replace CEO’s more often for 
financial reporting problems. It is not surprising that auditor turnover is also greater for 
the restating companies. Outside director turnover and audit committee turnover are 
significantly higher (at the .1% level) for the restating companies. Finally, although the 
total other directorships of the two samples are similar at the starting year, the restating 
company directors lose twice as many other directorships as the control sample 
companies (significant at the .1% level). These results suggest that directors of restating 
companies, particularly audit committee directors, experience turnover at a rate greater 
than for other companies with a similar level of performance. These directors also lose 
more other directorships than directors of the control group.  
                                                 
25 Results using the 242 companies are similar to that with the total sample. Hence, I present results with 
the entire sample. 
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for this subsample. The two samples are similar in performance but the median restating 
firm is larger than the control firm. Once again, auditor turnover is significantly greater 
for the restating firms. Both outside director turnover and audit committee turnover are 
significantly higher for the restating companies. Total loss in other directorships is also 
significantly greater for the restating firm directors. This provides some preliminary 
evidence that restating firm directors, and particularly audit committee directors, 
experience greater turnover and loss in other positions than a performance-matched 
sample, even after matching for CEO turnover. 
6.3 Director Turnover  
 Table 13 provides results from firm level analysis of the restating and control 
samples. Because I create the control sample by matching at the firm level I do not report 
the results at the individual director level.26
                                                 
26 However, I also conduct individual director level tests on a pooled sample of restatement and control 
sample firms similar to that in table 6 and find results consistent with the inferences drawn in this section. 
 In this section I use the regression framework 
to examine if audit committee directors turnover at a greater rate than non audit 
committee directors in the restating company compared to that in the control sample. 
Panel A presents results of a differences model. The dependent variable is the turnover in 
the audit committee less the turnover of non-audit committee directors in the restating 
company in three years following the restatement less the same difference in the control 
sample company. The explanatory variables are also expressed as differences between the 
restating and control firms. In model 1 the constant identifies the restatement. Model 2 
and 3 use DURATION and MAGNITUDE to measure restatement severity, respectively. 
The control firms get a 0 value for DURATION and MAGNITUDE. The estimates from 
all three models show that audit committee directors of turnover at a greater rate than the 
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non-audit committee directors in the restating company compared to the control sample. 
Panel B presents estimates from the sub-sample where both the restating and matched 
firms experience CEO turnover. The inferences are consistent with that in panel A.    
6.4 Loss in Other Directorships 
 The univariate results showed that directors in the restating companies lose more 
other directorships than those in the control sample companies. In this section I examine 
if audit committee directors of the restating companies lose more than non-audit 
committee directors compared to directors in the control group companies. Table 14 
presents results from the firm level analysis.27
 I conduct some robustness tests on sub samples and with alternate specifications. I 
examine the sub sample of companies that restated following the SEC Staff Accounting 
Bulletin 101.
 The dependant variable is the total loss in 
other directorships for audit committee directors less the loss for non audit committee 
directors in the restating company less the same difference for the control sample firm. 
As before in model 1, the constant identifies the restatement, model 2 uses DURATION 
and model 3 uses MAGNITUDE. Estimates from all three models are consistent with 
each other and suggest that the restating company audit committee directors lose more 
other board positions than do non-audit committee directors compared to those in the 
control group.  
6.5 Robustness Checks 
28
                                                 
27 I also conduct individual director level analysis similar to that in table 9 using a pooled sample and find 
results consistent with the inferences in this section 
28 These are restatements initiated on account of the SEC clarifying its position on revenue recognition 
transactions. Although these may point to the use of aggressive accounting techniques, all of these were 
corrections to comply with new SEC rules. 
 I do not find evidence of increased audit committee member turnover on 
the own board or loss in other director positions perhaps because these restatements were 
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initiated following an SEC directive. I estimated model 1 in table 6 using turnover in year 
1 instead of the three-year turnover. The results remain substantially unaltered but for the 
following changes. Estimates from table 6, model 1 (DURATION measure of severity) 
show similar magnitudes and significance for DURATION and slightly improved 
magnitude and similar significance for the interaction term. Tenure is no longer 
significant and board share improves the significance from the 10% level to the 5% level. 
All other variables behave similarly.  
7. Other Penalties 
7.1 Legal Penalties  
 
 In this section I examine whether outside directors face penalties following 
restatements from SEC enforcement action or securities litigation.  
7.1.1. SEC Enforcement Action 
 The SEC investigated and issued an AAER against 65 of the 409 companies in the 
sample. Of these, 61 were against the 264 companies in the income-decreasing 
restatements sample and 4 were against the companies in the income-increasing 
restatement sample. None of the technical restatement companies faced SEC enforcement 
action. The SEC has not cited an outside director in any of the AAERs issued for the 
companies in the sample.29
                                                 
29 Recently, however, the SEC enforcement chief Stephen Cutler has signaled a change in attitude towards 
outside directors, even those not directly involved in fraud (Zwirn [2003]). In the case of Chancellor Corp, 
the SEC has charged an audit committee director whom the SEC alleges “recklessly ignored signs of 
improper accounting treatment thereby allowing management’s fraud to continue” (SEC AAER No. 1764, 
April 24, 2003). 
 The enforcement action typically is directed at managers 
(such as the CEO, CFO, Controller) and auditors of these companies. 
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7.1.2. Securities Litigation  
Prior legal literature suggests that the primary reason for limited legal liability 
incurred by directors is the protection offered under law for good faith conduct. Courts 
have traditionally provided wide latitude under the business judgment rule for alleged 
breaches of fiduciary responsibility (Bishop [1968], Black, Cheffins, and Klausner 
[2003]. Black, Cheffins, and Klausner [2003] argue that actual liability for directors is 
almost eliminated by a combination of indemnification by their companies, D&O 
(Directors and Officers) insurance, procedural rules, and settlement incentives of the 
plaintiffs, defendants, and insurers. However, there remains the nuisance cost of 
litigation, which they suggest is one factor that can motivate directors to be vigilant in 
monitoring managers. Black, Cheffins, and Klausner [2003] highlight the popular feeling 
that directorship comes with risk of legal liability and this is a leading reason for 
candidates turn down board responsibilities.  
To examine whether outsider directors suffer costs from lawsuits filed for 
violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 
against the restating companies, I collect data from the Stanford Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse on the parties named in the securities class action lawsuit.30
Lawsuits were filed against 146 of the 409 sample companies. Of these, 135 were 
against the income-decreasing restatement companies and 11 were against the income-
increasing restaters. None of the technical restatement companies were sued. Overall, 78 
outside directors (of 2,016) were named as defendants in these lawsuits, of which 68 (of 
 
                                                 
30In several cases the complaint document was not available from this database. In these cases, I collected 
details from the Web sites of the plaintiff’s law firm or from the Web sites of the major class action notice 
and claims administrators. This procedure enabled me to collect data for all the companies. The major class 
action claims administrator Web sites used for this search were www.gilardi.com and www.berdonllp.com. 
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1,272) were from the income-decreasing sample. Of these 68 directors (from only 26 
companies), 39 are audit committee members. From the income-increasing sample, only 
10 directors from 5 companies were named as defendants. Therefore, even for the 
income-decreasing sample only about 5.5% of outside directors and audit committee 
members are named in these lawsuits.31
 To examine whether investors use restatements as a signal to infer poor 
monitoring by directors, I examine the stock price reaction for companies that share 
directors with restating companies. Prior research suggests that investors react to news 
about governance abilities of directors. Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard [2003] report a 
significant abnormal return of 2.1% over a two day (0,1) window when companies 
 Even if the nuisance costs of being sued are high, 
it appears that only a small proportion of outside directors are exposed to this. 
In all cases where settlement details are available, the directors (and officers) who 
are charged as defendants do not pay any portion of the costs themselves. The settlement 
amounts are typically paid by the company’s D&O insurance and by the company itself. 
This suggests that although litigation may be costly to the company, explicit litigation 
related costs borne by outside directors are not significant. However, one potentially large 
cost for directors not captured in this analysis is the time involved in investigation, 
depositions, audit committee meetings, and so forth. 
7.2 Investor Reaction 
                                                 
31 Content analysis of the complaints suggests that outside directors are named only when they have sold 
the company’s stock during the misstatement period. Absent an analysis of the trading behavior of all the 
directors in the sample, it is not possible to conclude that stock sales during the misstatement period affect 
the likelihood of being sued. However, the preliminary evidence from the complaints suggests that outsider 
director stock sales during the misstatement period could be an important determinant of the director being 
named in the lawsuit. 
 37 
announce the appointment of a director who already has multiple directorships (a proxy 
for reputation).32
8. Conclusion  
  
I conduct an event study to measure the industry adjusted CAR for companies that 
share directors with the income-decreasing restating sample over a two-day window (0,1) 
surrounding the restatement announcement. The results show that companies that share 
directors with restating companies experience an industry adjusted CAR of -0.24% 
(significant at the 10% level). The market reaction is greater for companies whose CEO 
serves as a director in the restating company, with an industry adjusted CAR of -1.41% 
over the same window (significant at the 1% level).  
These results suggest that investors revise their valuation of companies when their 
directors are associated with the restating companies. The impact is greater when the 
shared director is the CEO of their company likely because of the greater role of the CEO 
managing the company or because of the higher visibility for CEOs.  
 In this study I examine career and litigation consequences of accounting 
restatements for outside directors. Penalties for outside directors from securities litigation 
and enforcement action by the SEC are limited. Few outside directors are charged in 
securities class action lawsuits, and none has been sanctioned by the SEC. Moreover, 
directors do not pay any portion of the settlement because they are protected by insurance 
and by the company from personal financial loss.  
However, directors of companies that make severe income-decreasing 
restatements face a high risk of turnover on the restating company board. Furthermore, 
                                                 
32 Other studies that present event study evidence in a similar context include Shivdasani and Yermack 
[1999] and Perry and Peyer [2003]. 
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for severe restatements the likelihood of departure is higher for audit committee 
members, who have direct responsibility for overseeing the financial reporting process, 
than for non-audit committee directors. Outside directors also lose positions on other 
boards following a restatement. This loss increases in restatement severity, particularly 
for audit committee members.  
I also find weak evidence that directors of income-increasing restatement 
companies suffer similar penalties, though consistent inference is difficult. As expected, I 
find no evidence of any penalty for directors or audit committee members in the technical 
restatements sample. The matched-sample analysis complements the within sample tests 
and provides further evidence that the labor market consequences of restatements for 
audit committee directors is greater than for non-audit committee directors.  
I eliminate from the sample all firms that have delisted or merged following the 
restatement. In a sense these are the worst performers and penalties for directors should 
be the most severe in these firms. All the directors of the delisted firms are no longer 
directors of the listed company. The same would be the case for merged companies 
because in directors of the acquired entity do not normally join the acquiring board 
(Harford [2003]). Based on the results in the other samples, we may expect that these 
directors would also suffer a loss in other directorships. 
It is an open question whether a restatement signifies success or failure on the part 
of the audit committee, as audit committees oversee the process under which accounting 
irregularities are both committed and detected. Success implies rewards and failure 
implies penalties. Although both these effects could be present, the results suggest that 
the net effect of failure dominates. 
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These results are consistent with directors, particularly audit committee members, 
bearing a reputational penalty for weak board and audit committee oversight. However, it 
is possible instead that the results reflect directors voluntarily opting out of boards. 
Directors may leave their positions if the restatement causes them to revalue the cost of 
the effort required as greater than the benefits from board membership. Because 
companies do not identify the reasons for director departure, it is difficult to judge 
whether turnover is voluntary or forced. Either way, the restatement can be considered as 
negatively affecting board members because it reduces their opportunities to serve, and 
benefit from the reputation and prestige that board membership offers.  
In conclusion, although the evidence can be interpreted as ex-post settling up in 
the labor market for directors, it is unclear whether this penalty is fully appreciated ex-
ante by directors. Furthermore, it is an open question whether such costs alone provide 
adequate motivation for outside directors, particularly in light of the regulatory intent to 
assign a greater role for audit committees to improve the quality of financial reporting. 
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Table 1 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Name Definitions 
DIRECTOR DEPARTURE 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the director leaves the board within three years 
of the restatement, and 0 otherwise. 
OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS Number of positions held as an outside director in other public companies. 
OTHER DIRECTOR LOSS 
Net loss in the number of other directorships held by the director in the three 
years following the restatement announcement. 
AUDIT COMM 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the director is member of the firms audit 
committee and 0 otherwise. 
SEVERITY 
Severity of the restatement measured by DURATION and MAGNITUDE defined 
below. 
DURATION Number of quarters for which net income is restated. 
MAGNITUDE 
Cumulative amount of net income restated scaled by total assets at the year-end 
before the restatement announcement. 
REST QTRS SERVED 
Measures the actual number of quarter the directors served during the 
misstatement period. 
PERFORMANCE 
Firms’ stock return in the same three year window as used to measure 
DEPARTURE and OTHER DIRECTOR LOSS less CRSP value-weighted index, 
with both returns compounded continuously before differencing. 
SIZE Total assets in billions at the year-end prior to the restatement announcement. 
CEO TURNOVER 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO of the restating company is changed 
within three years of the restatement and 0 otherwise. 
BOARD SIZE Number of directors on the board of the restating company. 
BOARD SHARE 
Board shareholding in the restating company measured by the percentage of the 
firm's equity held by the board as a whole. 
OUTSIDERS Ratio of outside directors to the total board size 
CEO FOUNDER 
Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is the founder of the company 
or belongs to the founding family. 
AGE Age of the director at the restatement year. 
TENURE 
Number of years the director has spent on the board of the restating company at 
the time of the restatement announcement. 
DIRECTOR SHARE 
Directors shareholding in the restating company measured by the percentage of 
shares of the total equity of the company held by the director. 
OTHER CEO 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if director is CEO of another public company and 
0 otherwise. 
FIN EXPERT 
Indicator variable identifying whether the director is a financial expert as defined 
under SEC “Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committee” (SEC 
[2003]); it equals1 if financial expert, 0 otherwise. 
DIR AFTER CEO 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the director joined the board after the CEO and 
0 otherwise. 
DIR SELLER 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if director is a net seller in the company stock 
during the misstatement period, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2 
 
Sample Selection 
 
 
Total number of restatements announced from 1997 to 2000 794 
 
 Less: Companies that did not eventually restate     11 
 
 Less: Repeat restatements by the same company:    74 
 
 Less: Foreign companies       32 
 
 Less: Companies not on Compustat or CRSP    81 
         
 Less: Companies that stop proxy disclosures  
because of delisting or mergers    187 
 
Companies with required information available – final sample 409 
 
Restatements for “technical” reasons  
not amounting to misstatements      76 
 
Income-increasing restatements         69 
Income-decreasing restatements (primary sample)              264 
Total                                                                 409
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Distribution of Sample Companies by Year and Industry 
 
Panel A reports the distribution of sample companies by year of restatement announcement as reported in 
General Accounting Office [2002]. The columns titled “Income-Decreasing” “Income-Increasing” and 
“Technical” refer to companies in the income-decreasing, income-increasing , and technical restatement 
samples, respectively. Industries are defined by the following SIC codes: Agriculture, mining and 
construction = 0-1999; Manufacturing = 2000-3999 (except codes assigned to Technology); Technology = 
3570 – 3579 plus 7370-7379; Transportation = 4000-4799; Communications = 4800- 4899; Utilities = 
4900-4999; Wholesale/retail = 5000-5999; Financial Services = 6000-6999; Services = 7000-8999 (except 
codes assigned to Technology). Industry classification is taken from Palmrose and Scholz [2004]. 
 
 
 Income Decreasing Income Increasing Technical Total  
Year N % N % N % N % 
1997 35 13.3% 8 11.6% 10 13.2% 53 12.9% 
1998 43 16.3% 8 11.6% 7 9.2% 58 14.2% 
1999 50 18.9% 29 42.0% 11 14.4% 90 22.0% 
2000 73 27.7% 6 8.8% 24 31.6% 103 25.2% 
2001 63 23.8 % 18 26.0% 24 31.6% 105 25.7% 
Total 264 100% 69 100% 76 100% 409 100% 
 
Panel B: Industry Distribution of Sample Companies 
Agriculture, 
mining, 
construction 6 2.3% 2 2.9% 0 0.0% 8 2.0% 
Communication 4 1.5% 0 0.0% 1 1.3% 4 1.0% 
Financial 
services 37 14.0% 7 10.1% 11 14.5% 55 13.4% 
Manufacturing 91 34.5% 26 37.7% 34 44.7% 151 36.9% 
Services 32 12.1% 6 8.7% 4 5.3% 42 10.3% 
Technology 59 22.3% 19 27.5% 8 10.5% 86 21.0% 
Transportation 4 1.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 4 1.0% 
Utilities 7 2.7% 0 0.0% 3 3.9% 11 2.7% 
Wholesale/retail 23 8.7% 9 13.0% 15 19.7% 47 11.5% 
Other 1 0.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 
Total 264 100% 69 100% 76 100% 409 100% 
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 Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Sample companies and Outside Directors of Sample Companies 
 
Please refer to table 1 for variable definitions. The column titled “Income-Decreasing”, “Income-
Increasing”, and “Technical” refer to companies in the Income-decreasing, income-increasing , and 
technical restatement samples, respectively. 
 
  Income Decreasing  Income Increasing  Technical 
 Variable  Mean (Median)   Mean (Median)  Mean (Median) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for restating companies.  
RESTATEMENT AMOUNT 
($millions)  41.5 (5.0)  28.30 (12.0)  22.4 (3.2) 
MAGNITUDE (scaled)  8.3% (1.9%)  7.1% (4.5%)*  6.5% (0.8%)a 
DURATION (no. of Quarters)  6.1 (4)  5.5 (4)  5.1a (4) 
ANNOUNCEMENT RETURN (0,1)   -13.14%*** (-7.4%)***  -4.7%a,*** (-4.6%)a,***  -0.4%a (-0.2%)a 
PERFORMANCE   -11.6% (-24.2%)  -2.28%a (- 5.8%) a  17.5% a (4.3%)a 
SIZE (total assets $ millions)  2460 (224)  4475a (462) a  1913 (443)a 
BOARD SIZE  7.6 (7)  7.4 (7)  8.1 (7) 
BOARD SHARE  21.1% (14.8%)  15.9%a (7.9%)  14.8%a (11.0%) 
OUTSIDERS  63.0% (67.0%)  65.5%a (66.6%) a  67.0%a (66.7%)a 
OUTSIDE DIRECTOR TURNOVER   48.1%   27.8%a   18.6%a  
NUMBER OF COMPANIES SUED  135   11   0  
SEC AAER ACTIONS  61   4   0  
CEO TURNOVER  147   22   8  
AUDITOR CHANGE  117   20   11  
N   264   69   76  
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for outside directors 
AGE    57.5 (58)    57.2 (57)    56.6 (56) 
TENURE    6.3 (5.0)    5.8 (4.0)    7.1 (6.0) 
DIRECTOR SHARE    1.24 (0.07)    0.68 (0.02)    0.97 (0.04) 
OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS    1.28 (1.0)    1.35 (1.0)    1.24 (1.0) 
AUDIT COMM DIRECTORS    712     175     226  
N    1272     332     412  
       
a Indicates that the mean (median) is significantly different from the mean (median) of the income-
decreasing sample at the 5% level  or less (two-sided) based on a t-test (Wilcoxon test). 
*** implies significantly different from zero at the 1% level (two-tailed).  
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FIG. 1— Outside director turnover in restating companies.  The plots below show the average outside 
director turnover for companies in the income-decreasing, income-increasing, and technical restatements 
samples. Year 0 is the year of the restatement announcement. The legend below identifies the plots. 
“Decreasing” refers to the income-decreasing restatements sample, “Increasing” refers to the income-
increasing restatements sample, and “Technical” refers to the technical restatements sample. 
 
 
Figure 2 
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FIG. 2— Outside director turnover in the income-decreasing restatements sample.  The plots below show 
the average outside director turnover for companies in income-decreasing sample. Year 0 is the year of the 
restatement announcement. The legend below identifies the plots. “Interim restatements” refers to the 
sample of companies that issue quarterly restatements, “Annual restatements” refer to companies that 
restate audited annual financials, and “Total sample” refers to the entire sample of income decreasing 
restatements. 
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Table 5 
Univariate Correlations 
The table presents correlations matrix for the primary sample of income-decreasing restatements. Please refer to table 1 for variable definitions. ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level (two-tailed). 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 
1. DIRECTOR 
DEPARTURE                    
2. OTHER 
DIRECTOR LOSS 0.16**                   
3. AUDIT COMM -0.01 0.13**                  
4. DURATION 0.23** 0.21** -0.01                 
5. MAGNITUDE 0.18** 0.23** -0.02 0.42**                
6. PERFORMANCE -0.15** -0.04** -0.03 -0.11** -0.08**               
7. SIZE -0.03 0.09** -0.10** 0.10** 0.24** 0.05              
8. CEO TURNOVER 0.23** 0.15** -0.02 0.15** -0.01 -0.22** -0.00             
9. BOARD SIZE -0.01 0.09** -0.20** 0.16** 0.04 -0.02 0.45** 0.00            
10. BOARD SHARE 0.04** -0.04 0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.11** -0.29** -0.13** -0.30**           
11. OUTSIDERS -0.03 -0.06** -0.02 0.01 -0.13** 0.03 0.13** 0.01 0.03 -0.15**          
12. CEO FOUNDER 0.01 -0.05 0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.10 -0.04 -0.25** 0.20** -0.21**         
13. AGE 0.03 0.13** 0.07** 0.04 0.11** 0.05 0.15** -0.07 0.11** -0.06** 0.11** -0.17**        
14.TENURE -0.06** 0.06** 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.10** -0.17** 0.10** -0.10** 0.02 -0.10 0.38**       
15. DIRECTOR 
SHARE 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 -0.10** 0.08** -0.10** 0.30** -0.00 -0.04** -0.06** 0.00      
16. OTHER CEO -0.01 -0.09** 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.10** 0.00 0.09** -0.04 0.05 -0.02** -0.02 -0.07** -0.10**     
17. OTHER 
DIRECTORSHIPS -0.01** 0.62** 0.08** 0.12** 0.17** -0.08** 0.25** 0.15** 0.15** -0.11** 0.06 -0.15** 0.18** 0.05 0.07** -0.01    
18. FIN EXPERT 0.00 0.10** 0.34** 0.07** 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.08** -0.00 -0.06 -0.05 0.00 0.21** 0.08**   
19. DIR AFTER CEO 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.03 -0.05 -0.10 -0.05 0.03** -0.06** 0.27** -0.03** 0.14 -0.19** -0.33** -0.04 0.03 -0.10 0.00  
20. NET SELLER 0.04** 0.12** 0.04** 0.06** 0.08** 0.11 -0.00 0.07** -0.01 -0.00 0.05** 0.00 0.02 0.16** 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.07 
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Table 6 
Loss of Board Position in Restating Company 
Income-Decreasing Restatements 
 
The table presents estimates from a logit regression of the probability of outside director departure from the board on 
director level and firm level variables. Y=1 if the director leaves the board. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and are adjusted for clustering by company. Models 1 and 4 measures SEVERITY by DURATION, 
model 2 measures SEVERITY by MAGNITUDE, and model 3 by REST QTRS SERVED. Please refer to table 1 for 
variable definitions. N=1,272 for all the models. *,**, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-tailed). 
Pr (Y = 1) = F (α0 + α1AUDIT COMM + α2SEVERITY + α3AUDIT COMM X SEVERITY + α4PERFORMANCE + α5SIZE + 
α6CEO TURNOVER + α7BOARD SIZE + α8BOARD SHARE + α9OUTSIDERS + α10CEO 
FOUNDER + α11AGE + α12TENURE + α13DIRECTOR SHARE + α14OTHER CEO + α15OTHER 
DIRECTORSHIPS + α16FIN EXPERT + α17DIR AFTER CEO + α18DIR SELLER + εi) (1) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
Constant -1.87 (-2.61)*** -2.40 (-2.99)*** -2.04 (-2.69)*** -1.32 (-1.73)* 
         
AUDIT COMM -0.25 (-1.12) -0.07 (-0.44) -0.16 (-0.68) -0.27 (-1.24) 
DURATION  0.04 (2.13)**      0.06 (2.29)** 
AUDIT COMM x 
DURATION  0.05 (2.23)**      0.06 (2.90)** 
MAGNITUDE   0.99 (2.82)***     
AUDIT COMM X 
MAGNITUDE   1.94 (2.03)**     
REST QTRS SERVED     0.04 (2.02)**   
AUDIT COMM x REST 
QTRS SERVED     0.06 (2.24)**   
         
PERFORMANCE -0.32 (-2.19)*** -0.34 (-1.98)** -0.31 (-2.06)** -0.48 (-2.76)*** 
SIZE -0.00 (-0.02) -0.00 (-0.97)  -0.00 (-0.28)  -0.00 (-0.49) 
CEO TURNOVER  0.63 (3.99)*** 0.67 (4.01)*** 0.62 (4.15)***   
BOARD SIZE  0.04 (0.80) 0.08 (1.47) 0.05 (1.06) -0.01 (-0.40) 
BOARD SHARE  0.01 (1.86)* 0.01 (1.44) 0.01 (1.79)*  0.00 (0.76) 
OUTSIDERS  0.00 (0.06) 0.00 (0.60) -0.00 (-0.07)  0.00 (0.02) 
CEO FOUNDER  0.01 (0.04) 0.13 (0.50) -0.02 (-0.07) -0.10 (-0.34) 
         
AGE  0.02 (1.79)* 0.01 (1.84)* 0.01 (1.89)*  0.02 (1.96)** 
TENURE -0.03 (-1.81)* -0.02 (-1.88)* -0.03 (-1.98)** -0.05 (-2.51)** 
DIRECTOR SHARE -0.01 (-0.88) -0.01 (-1.04) -0.02 (-1.16) -0.00 (-0.09) 
OTHER CEO -0.10 (-0.47) -0.07 (-0.36) -0.07 (-0.41) -0.08 (-0.44) 
OTHER 
DIRECTORSHIPS -0.07 (-2.06)** -0.08 (-1.92)* -0.07 (-1.94)* -0.05 (-1.72)* 
FIN EXPERT -0.03 (-0.17) -0.05 (-0.28) -0.03 (-0.17) -0.04 (-0.18) 
DIR AFTER CEO -0.20 (-0.79) -0.11 (-0.41) -0.15 (-0.56) -0.17 (-0.68) 
DIR SELLER  0.22 (1.86)*  0.25 (1.97)**  0.26 (2.08)**  0.18 (1.90)* 
         
Pseudo R2 0.1876  0.1948  0.1764  0.1340  
Y = 1 correctly classified 66%  64%  64%  60%  
Y = 0 correctly classified 76%  75%  72%  70%  
Overall Correctly 
Classified 71%  70%  68%  65%  
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Table 7 
Firm-Level Board and Audit Committee Turnover Income-Decreasing Restatements 
 
The table presents the results of firm level OLS regressions for the models given. The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity. Model 1 measures restatement severity by DURATION and 
model 2 measures it by MAGNITUDE. Please refer to Table 1 for variable definitions. N is 264 for all 
models. *, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed). 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  
Panel A: % AC Turnover   = f (Restatement Severity, Control Variables) 
Constant  25.96 (2.12)** 29.76 (2.88)*** 
SEVERITY  1.34 (2.93)*** 28.99 (3.89)*** 
PERFORMANCE  -8.04 (-2.57)** -7.86 (-2.05)** 
SIZE  1.47 (0.85) 2.41 (1.40) 
CEO TURNOVER  20.16 (3.53)*** 22.01 (4.09)*** 
BOARD SIZE  -0.02 (-0.02) -0.01 (-0.01) 
BOARD SHARE  0.23 (1.95)* 0.23 (1.94)* 
OUTSIDERS  -0.02 (-0.16) -0.07 (-0.49) 
CEO FOUNDER  -0.01 (-0.23) 0.06 (0.56) 
Adj. R2  0.1961  0.2028  
 
Panel B: [% AC Turnover - % Non AC Turnover] = f (Restatement Severity, Control Variables) 
Constant  21.81 (1.62) 27.66 (1.93)* 
SEVERITY  0.60 (2.04)** 21.84 (2.03)** 
PERFORMANCE  -12.44 (-2.15)** -11.81 (-2.08)** 
SIZE  4.79 (2.40)** 5.37  (2.70)**  
CEO TURNOVER  10.54 (2.12)** 9.62 (1.92)* 
BOARD SIZE  -3.01 (-1.62) -3.26 (-1.55) 
BOARD SHARE  0.24 (1.64) 0.25 (1.75)* 
OUTSIDERS  -0.26 (-1.37) -0.28 (-1.46) 
CEO FOUNDER  0.04 (0.57) -0.02 (-0.15) 
Adj. R2  0.1126  0.1245  
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Table 8 
Loss of Board Position in Restating Company for Income-Increasing and Technical 
Restatements 
 
The table presents estimates from a logit regression of equation (1). Y=1 if the director leaves the board. 
Models 1 and 2 present results for the Income-increasing restatements sample, and models 3 and 4 present 
results from the Technical restatements sample. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and are adjusted for clustering by company. Models 1 and 3 measure SEVERITY by 
DURATION, and models 2 and 4 measure SEVERITY by MAGNITUDE. Please refer to Table 1 for 
variable definitions. *, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed). 
Pr (Y=1) = F (α0 + α1AUDIT COMM + α2SEVERITY + α3AUDIT COMM X SEVERITY + α4PERFORMANCE + α5SIZE + 
α6CEO TURNOVER + α7BOARD SIZE + α8BOARD SHARE + α9OUTSIDERS + α10CEO 
FOUNDER + α11AGE + α12TENURE + α13DIRECTOR SHARE + α14OTHER CEO + α15OTHER 
DIRECTORSHIPS + α16FIN EXPERT + α17DIR_AFTER_CEO + α18DIR SELLER + εi) (1) 
 Income-Increasing Sample   Technical Sample  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
Constant -0.38 (-0.90) -2.00 (-0.71) -2.64 (-1.99)** -3.02 (-1.49) 
AUDIT COMM -1.11 (-1.86)* -0.41 (-0.65) -0.42 (-0.65) 0.33 (0.82) 
DURATION 0.01 (0.28)   -0.08 (-0.95)   
AUDIT COMM X DURATION 0.10 (2.00)**   0.21 (0.19)   
MAGNITUDE   3.68 (1.88)*   2.25 (0.17) 
AUDIT COMM x MAGNITUDE   4.12 (1.70)*   -1.16 (-0.26) 
         
PERFORMANCE -0.40 (-1.50) -0.75 (-2.0)** -0.56 (-2.32)** -0.32 (-2.62)** 
SIZE 0.00 (0.55) 0.00 (0.22) -0.01 (-1.97)** -0.00 (-1.50) 
CEO TURNOVER 0.10 (0.55) 0.08 (0.21) 1.21 (1.52) 0.68 (0.72) 
BOARD SIZE -0.13 (-2.02)** -0.08 (-0.98) 0.17 (1.74)* 0.03 (0.27) 
BOARD SHARE 0.03 (2.57)** 0.02 (2.14)** -0.00 (-0.17) 0.01 (0.79) 
OUTSIDERS 0.01 (1.51) 0.00 (0.87) 0.21 (0.71) 0.57 (0.36) 
CEO FOUNDER 0.06 (0.08) -0.05 (-0.36) 0.02 (0.56) 0.01 (0.68) 
AGE 0.00 (0.31) 0.00 (0.44) 0.01 (0.21) -0.01 (-0.10) 
TENURE -0.06 (-1.78)* -0.05 (-1.73)* 0.03 (1.86)* 0.01 (1.59) 
DIRECTOR SHARE -0.05 (-1.90)* -0.17 (-2.32)** -0.01 (-0.29) -0.01 (-0.06) 
OTHER CEO -0.95 (-2.34)** -0.72 (-1.80)* 1.15 (0.99) 1.05 (0.96) 
OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS -0.10 (-0.54) -0.03 (-0.21) 0.05 (0.36) 0.02 (0.14) 
FIN EXPERT -0.24 (-0.78) -0.41 (-0.98) -1.91 (-1.02) -1.88 (-1.22) 
DIR AFTER CEO -0.08 (-0.65) -0.07 (-0.58) 0.09 (1.01) 0.07 (0.80) 
DIR SELLER 0.09 (1.19) 0.02 (0.56) 0.01 (0.23) -0.02 (-0.23) 
Pseudo R2 0.1310  0.1261  0.1132  0.0812  
N 332  332  412  412  
Y = 1 correctly classified 81%  82%  55%  51%  
Y = 0 correctly classified 75%  74%  91%  90%  
Overall correctly classified 77%  76%  84%  83%  
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Figure 3 
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FIG. 3—Other directorships.  The graph shows the average number of other directorships held by directors 
of the restating companies. The legend below identifies the plots. “Decreasing” refers to the income-
decreasing restatements sample, “Increasing” refers to the income-increasing restatements sample and 
“Technical” refers to the technical restatements sample. The x-axis is the time (years) relative to the 
restatement announcement year. The y-axis gives the average number of other directorships. Year 0 is the 
year of the restatement announcement. 
Figure 4 
Other Directorships – Income Decreasing Restatement Sample 
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FIG. 4—Other directorships in the income-decreasing restatement sample.  The graph shows the average 
number of other directorships held by directors of the income-decreasing restatements sample. The legend 
below identifies the plots.  “Interim restatements” refers to the sample of companies that issue quarterly 
restatements, “Annual restatements” refers to companies that restate audited annual financials, and “Total 
sample” refers to the entire sample of income-decreasing restatements. The x-axis is the time (years) 
relative to the restatement announcement year. The y-axis gives the average number of other directorships. 
Year 0 is the year of the restatement announcement. 
 53 
Table 9 
Loss in Other Board Positions-Income-Decreasing Restatements 
 
Estimates from an OLS regression of loss in the number of other directorships, on firm level and director 
level variables.  The t-statistics (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and are adjusted for 
clustering by company. Model 1 measures SEVERITY by DURATION, model 2 measures SEVERITY by 
MAGNITUDE, and model 3 measures SEVERITY by REST QTRS SERVED.  Please refer to Table 1 for 
variable definitions. N = 1,272 for all the models. *, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels (two-tailed). 
 
OTHER DIRECTOR LOSS =    β0 + β1AUDIT COMM + β2SEVERITY + β3AUDIT COMM X SEVERITY + 
β4PERFORMANCE + β5SIZE + β6AGE + β7TENURE + β8OTHER CEO + 
β9OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS + β10FIN EXPERT + β11DIRECTOR  
DEPARTURE + β12DIR SELLER + ηI                                                            (2) 
 
 Model 1  Model 2   Model 3  
Constant -0.79 (-3.06)*** -0.77 (-3.13)***  -0.37 (-2.91)*** 
        
AUDIT COMM -0.08 (-0.65) -0.05 (-0.40)  0.06 (0.75) 
DURATION 0.03 (2.05)**      
AUDIT COMM X DURATION 0.03 (2.28)**      
MAGNITUDE   0.41 (2.90)***    
AUDIT COMM X MAGNITUDE   0.34 (2.09)**    
REST QTRS SERVED      0.03 (1.83)* 
AUDIT COMM X REST QTRS 
SERVED      0.04 (2.41)** 
        
PERFORMANCE -0.06 (-0.77) -0.06 (-0.86)  -0.05 (-0.66) 
SIZE -0.00 (-1.13) -0.00 (-1.34)  -0.00 (-2.20)** 
AGE 0.01 (1.93)* 0.01 (2.10)*  0.01 (1.71)* 
TENURE 0.00 (0.74) 0.00 (0.34)  0.00 (0.89) 
OTHER CEO -0.26 (-2.54)** -0.25 (-2.45)**  -0.26 (-2.51)** 
OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS 0.45 (8.50)*** 0.46 (8.73)***  0.41 (8.72)*** 
FIN EXPERT 0.14 (1.76)* 0.14 (1.77)*  0.15 (1.66)* 
DIRECTOR DEPARTURE 0.36 (3.42)*** 0.37 (3.62)***  0.38 (3.68)*** 
DIR SELLER 0.12 (2.17)** 0.09 (2.08)**  0.14 (1.94)* 
        
Adj. R2 0.3970  0.3811   0.3924  
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TABLE 10 
Loss in Other Board Positions: Firm-Level Analysis of 
Income-Decreasing Restatements 
 
The table presents the results of firm-level OLS regressions for the models given. The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity. Model 1 measures SEVERITY by DURATION and model 2 
measures SEVERITY by MAGNITUDE.  Please refer to table 1 for variable definitions. N is 264 for all 
models. *, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed). 
 
 
 Model 1   Model 2  
Panel A: (AC Other Director Loss)  = f (Restatement Severity, Control Variables) 
Constant -0.92 (-4.15)***  -0.26 (-1.93)* 
SEVERITY 0.17 (4.56)***  3.12 (2.64)** 
PERFORMANCE 0.04 (0.28)  -0.03 (-0.35) 
SIZE -0.16 (-0.06)  -0.16 (-0.46) 
TOTAL OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS 0.20 (4.42)***  0.22 (5.12)*** 
      
Adj. R2 0.3622   0.3840  
N 264   264  
 Model 1   Model 2  
Panel B: [AC Other Director Loss - Non AC Other Director Loss] = f (Restatement Severity,  
                                                                                                                Control Variables) 
Constant -0.84 (-2.30)**  0.07 (0.56) 
SEVERITY 0.15 (3.75)***  1.95 (2.25)** 
PERFORMANCE 0.11 (0.92)  0.06 (0.52) 
SIZE 0.01 (0.09)  0.00 (0.25) 
TOTAL OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS 0.05 (0.59)  0.03 (0.42) 
      
Adj. R2 0.0969   0.0512  
N 264   264  
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Table 11 
Loss in Other Board Positions Income-Increasing and Technical Restatements Sample 
 
Estimates from an OLS regression of equation (2).  Models 1 and 2 present results for the income-
increasing restatements sample, and models 3 and 4 present results for the technical restatements sample.  
The t-statistics (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and are adjusted for clustering by company. 
Models 1 and 3 measure SEVERITY by DURATION, and models 2 and 4 measure SEVERITY by the 
MAGNITUDE. Please refer to table 1 for variable definitions. *, **, *** indicate two-sided significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
OTHER DIRECTOR LOSS =    β0 + β1AUDIT COMM + β2SEVERITY + β3AUDIT COMM X SEVERITY + 
β4PERFORMANCE + β5SIZE + β6AGE + β7TENURE + β8OTHER CEO + 
β9OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS + β10FIN EXPERT + β11DIRECTOR  
DEPARTURE + β12DIR SELLER + ηI                                                            (2) 
 
 Income-Increasing Sample   Technical Sample  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
Constant -0.54 (-0.96) -0.34 (-1.07) -0.61 (-1.36) -0.48 (-1.16) 
         
AUDIT COMM 0.19 (0.86) 0.17 (1.10) -0.06 (-0.52) -0.12 (-0.87) 
DURATION 0.01 (1.00)   -0.00 (-0.13)   
AUDIT COMM X DURATION 0.00 (0.52)   -0.00 (-0.10)   
MAGNITUDE   -1.92 (-0.91)   -1.95 (-0.82) 
AUDIT COMMX MAGNITUDE   2.13 (1.55)   2.45 (0.56) 
         
PERFORMANCE -0.01 (-0.56) -0.05 (-1.32) -0.13 (-1.54) -0.14 (-1.44) 
SIZE 0.00 (-0.20) -0.00 (-0.96) -0.00 (-0.74) -0.00 (-0.43) 
AGE 0.00 (0.53) 0.00 (0.37) 0.00 (0.23) 0.00 (0.35) 
TENURE -0.03 (-1.48) -0.02 (-1.59) 0.01 (0.90) 0.01 (0.70) 
OTHER CEO -0.45 (-2.02)** -0.48 (-2.18)** -0.38 (-1.73)* -0.29 (-1.12) 
OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS 0.45 (6.42)*** 0.40 (5.99)*** 0.31 (3.99)*** 0.30 (3.60)*** 
FIN EXPERT 0.02 (0.25) 0.02 (0.19) 0.07 (0.50) -0.02 (-0.01) 
DIRECTOR DEPARTURE -0.01 (-0.16) 0.03 (0.25) 0.08 (0.55) 0.05 (0.56) 
DIR SELLER 0.07 (1.28) 0.08 (1.10) 0.02 (0.15) 0.03 (0.20) 
         
Adj. R2 0.2016  0.1986  0.1725  0.1915  
N 332  332  412  412  
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Table 12 
Selected Summary Statistics for Sample and Control Firms 
 
The table reports various descriptive statistics for the sample of income-decreasing restatement companies 
and their year-, industry-, and performance-matched control firms.  TOTAL OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS is 
the sum of other directorships for all directors in the company, and TOTAL LOSS IN OTHER 
DIRECTORSHIPS is the loss cumulated over all the directors of the company. All other variables are 
defined in table 1. 
 
        Mean                               Median  
Variable   
Income -
Decreasing 
Restatements   
Control 
Sample   
p – 
valuea   
Income -
Decreasing 
Restatements   
Control 
Sample   
Wilcoxon 
p valueb 
Panel A:Entire sample of Income-decreasing restatement companies and control firms 
PERFORMANCE  -0.116  -0.121  0.94  -24.20%  -20.10%  0.611 
SIZE ($millions)  2460  2510  0.812  224  217  0.456 
CEO TURNOVER   55.68%  26.86%  <0.0001  1  0  <0.0001 
AUDITOR TURNOVER   44.3%  20.8%  <0.0001  0  0  <0.0001 
OUTSIDE DIRECTOR 
TURNOVER   48.1%  33.1%  0.001  45.0%  29.0%  <.0001 
AUDIT COMM TURNOVER  53.1%  30.7%  <0.0001  40.0%  25.0%  0.033 
TOTAL OTHER 
DIRECTORSHIPS  6.16  6.25  0.772  5  4  0.84 
TOTAL LOSS IN OTHER 
DIRECTORSHIPS  1.51  0.75  <.0001  0  0  0.012 
                          
Panel B: Subsample of 51 firms where both the restating and matched firm experienced CEO 
turnover  
PERFORMANCE   -0.291  -0.301  0.993  -44.01%  -44.89%  0.754 
SIZE ($millions)  800  552  0.117  163  149  0.02 
AUDITOR TURNOVER   55.5%  22.2%  0.0032  1  0  0.0047 
OUTSIDE DIRECTOR 
TURNOVER   58.6%  44.4%  0.035  50.0%  40.0%  0.052 
AUDIT COMM TURNOVER  65.0%  39.1%  0.001  66.6%  33.3%  <.0001 
TOTAL OTHER 
DIRECTORSHIPS  6.44  6.58  0.914  5  4  0.943 
TOTAL LOSS IN OTHER 
DIRECTORSHIPS   2.58   1.11   0.015   1   0.5   0.04 
 
a For the matched pairs t-test (two-tailed). 
b For the Wilcoxon signed ranks test (two-tailed). 
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Table 13 
Firm-Level Outside Director and Audit Committee Turnover Income-Decreasing 
Restatements and Control Sample 
 
The table presents the results of firm level OLS regressions for equation (3). The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity. Please refer to table 1 for variable definitions. Model 1 
expresses the constant as SEVERITY, model 2 measures SEVERITY by DURATION and model 3 by 
MAGNITUDE. Control firms get the value 0 for DURATION and MAGNITUDE. *, ** and *** indicate 
two sided significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed). 
 
[% AC Turnover - % Non AC Turnover] Restatement – Control 
                                                      = f (Restatement Severity, ∆ Control Variables)                                              (3) 
 
  Model1  Model 2  Model 3  
Panel A:  Entire sample of 264 matched pair of restating and control firms. 
Constant    2.20 (0.76) 2.25 (0.54) 
RESTATE SEVERITY  6.01 (2.07)** 2.14 (2.56)** 38.14 (3.32)*** 
PERFORMANCE  0.82 (0.09) 1.74 (0.55) -0.56 (-0.13) 
SIZE  -0.00 (-0.20) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.10) 
CEO TURNOVER  8.45 (2.04)** 7.38 (1.86)* 6.90 (1.98)** 
BOARD SIZE  0.94 (0.81) 1.07 (0.92) 0.98 (0.85) 
BOARD SHARE  -0.20 (-1.27) -0.18 (-1.22) -0.20 (-1.31) 
OUTSIDERS  -15.57 (-0.78) -14.51 (-0.85) -15.69 (-0.92) 
CEO FOUNDER  -1.53 (-0.24) 1.44 (0.52) -1.88 (-0.54) 
Adj. R2  0.0601  0.1786  0.1689  
Panel B:  Subsample of 51 firms where both the restating and matched firm experienced CEO 
turnover. 
Constant    14.51 (1.01) 9.07 (0.84) 
RESTATE SEVERITY  18.34 (2.30)** 0.56 (3.62)*** 56.69 (2.60)** 
PERFORMANCE  -10.41 (-1.02) -7.30 (-0.86) -4.46 (-0.47) 
SIZE  -0.00 (-0.16) 0.00 (0.09) 0.00 (0.00) 
BOARD SIZE  -3.50 (-1.09) -3.04 (-1.11) -3.12 (-1.04) 
BOARD SHARE  0.00 (0.81) 0.47 (1.07) 0.00 (0.80) 
OUTSIDERS  -31.00 (-0.57) -32.38 (-0.71) -26.03 (-0.52) 
CEO FOUNDER  -23.74 (-0.88) -17.73 (-0.78) -19.37 (-0.78) 
        
Adj. R2  0.0924  0.2274  0.1134  
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TABLE 14 
Loss in Other Board Positions for Income-Decreasing Restatements and Control Sample 
 
The table presents the results of firm level OLS regressions for equation (4).  The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity. Model 1 expresses the constant as SEVERITY. Model 2 
measures SEVERITY by DURATION and model 3 measures SEVERITY by MAGNITUDE. Control 
firms get the value 0 for DURATION and MAGNITUDE. Please refer to table 1 for variable definitions. N 
= 264 for all models. *, ** and *** indicate two sided significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed). 
 
 
[AC Other Director Loss – Non-AC Other Director Loss] Restatement – Control 
                         = f (Restatement Severity, ∆ Control Variables)                                                           (4) 
 
 Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   
Constant    -0.28 (-0.70)  0.14 (0.40)  
SEVERITY 0.33 (3.34)***  0.10 (2.56)**  2.32 (2.37)**  
PERFORMANCE 0.05 (0.23)  0.04 (0.15)  0.11 (0.63)  
SIZE -0.00 (-1.22)  -0.00 (-1.61)  -0.00 (-1.23)  
TOTAL OTHER 
DIRECTORSHIPS 0.16 (5.75)***  0.17 (5.94)***  0.16 (5.67)***  
          
Adj. R2 0.1496   0.1678   0.1728   
N 264   264   264   
 
 
